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Detaining the Uncooperative Migrant
SIENA ANSTIS & MOLLY JOECK
A migrant held in a Canadian prison refuses to hand over a DNA sample to the Canadian
Border Services Agency (CBSA). Another refuses to sign a statutory declaration of
voluntary return to Somalia where his return is anything but voluntary. Others outright
refuse at times to assist in any manner whatsoever with their own deportation. Canadian
officials, judges, and adjudicators have treated all of these situations as instances of
“non-cooperative” behaviour by an immigration detainee and, in turn, relied on such
conduct to impose lengthy and indefinite periods of immigration detention. While the
issue of an immigration detainee’s “non-cooperation” seems idiosyncratic and relatively
unimportant in the larger scheme of immigration controls in Canada, we argue that this
line of case law constitutes an example of the ambiguity surrounding the purpose of
immigration detention itself and, when considered in light of writing by Michel Foucault
and David Garland, reveals the State’s goal of individualizing, disciplining, and
controlling non-citizens in order to achieve certain political aims in response to fears
stoked by globalization. More specifically, we contend that where non-cooperation is
cited by Canadian courts and tribunals as a justification for detaining a non-citizen, the
supposedly nonpunitive nature of immigration detention is called into question. In this
article, Foucault’s writing on the disciplinary society is used as a lens to demonstrate
that, rather than immigration detention being used as a means to further the machinery of
immigration control, it is instead being used as a means of disciplining non-citizens who
have dared to “transgress” the Canadian border regime. David Garland’s writings on
crime control also show that immigration detention serves an expressive function,
allowing the Canadian government to denounce these perceived transgressions of
sovereignty committed by undisciplinable migrants for political traction. At the same
time, we seek to underline a fact that often goes unacknowledged in discussions around
immigration detention: namely, that non-cooperation can constitute a form of
resistance—an expression of agency and autonomy—on the part of migrants against the
machinery of the state. Finally, we conclude by arguing that the justification of lengthy
and indefinite periods of detention of non-citizens on the basis of non-cooperation is
instrumentally incoherent (in that detention on the basis of non-cooperation does not
seem to achieve the purpose of immigration control) and legally incoherent (in that the
statutory basis for non-cooperation as justification for lengthy and indefinite detention is
absent). We argue that the introduction of certain principles into the Canadian
immigration detention regime could remedy this significant problem.
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THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE DETENTION OF NON-CITIZENS who are perceived as failing to
cooperate in their own deportations—so-called “uncooperative migrants.” At first blush, noncooperation appears to be an idiosyncratic and relatively unimportant issue in the overall
architecture of immigration control in Canada. However, findings of non-cooperation have
serious consequences for the lives of detainees and their prospects for release—in particular, in
their closely intertwined relationship with indefinite detention. Moreover, the invocations of noncooperation in this context belie the supposedly non-punitive nature of immigration detention,
instead demonstrating that immigration detention serves a disciplinary function, allowing the
state to maintain a veneer of strict border control in an era where globalization has fomented
fears around encroachments on state sovereignty.
What precisely constitutes “uncooperative” behaviour by a migrant facing immigration
detention in Canada remains undefined and falls along a flexible and shifting spectrum in the
jurisprudence (both at the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board of
Canada [the “Division”] and in the courts) and in practice (i.e., the positions advanced by the
Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) in relation to detainees). For example, the Division
has considered—in deciding whether to continue the detention of a migrant—that a migrant is
uncooperative when they refuse to sign a statutory declaration of voluntary return even where
their return is by all accounts not voluntary. 1 The CBSA has argued that non-cooperation
includes the unwillingness of an individual subject to a removal order to provide personal family
information that the CBSA believed was critical in effecting deportation. 2
In light of the serious implications for non-citizens of tribunal and court reliance on “noncooperation” in detention matters, we seek to elucidate some of the leading jurisprudence
regarding non-cooperation in the immigration detention context and develop an argument as to
why it is an instrumentally and legally problematic construct. A review of key Canadian case law
on the issue of non-cooperation demonstrates a trend where some courts effectively (although
not necessarily explicitly) endorse the use of detention as a coercive measure to induce migrants
to collaborate in their own removal and to discipline conduct perceived to be transgressive. A
number of courts and adjudicators justify long-term and indefinite detention with little more than
a belief that migrants are—so to speak—the authors of their own misfortune and thus deserving
of their ongoing detention. 3 Such an analysis suggests that non-cooperation, instead of furthering
See e.g. the Division’s prior decisions in Warssama v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC
1311 at paras 5–12 [Warssama].
2
See e.g. Ali v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ONSC 2660 [Ali]. The CBSA claimed that efforts to deport Mr.
Ali were “hampered by Mr. Ali’s lack of cooperation, including his constantly changing account of where he lived
prior to coming to Canada; his different accounts of where he went to school prior to coming to Canada; his
inconsistent stories about his family and their whereabouts; the various aliases Mr. Ali has used during his time in
Canada; and the fact that the information about his past, that Mr. Ali has provided, has proven to be unverifiable or
false” (at para 7). The Superior Court, however, concluded that Mr. Ali had in fact provided the relevant
information, departing from the position of the Attorney General and multiple adjudicators of the Immigration
Division, all of whom had taken the position that he continued to withhold relevant information.
3
See Ebrahim Toure v Minister of Public Safety, 2017 ONSC 5878 [Toure ONSC], as affirmed in Toure v Canada
(Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness), 2018 ONCA 681 [Toure ONCA]; Canada v Dadzie, 2016 ONSC 6045
[Dadzie]; Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Lunyamila, 2016 FC 1199 [Lunyamila]; and
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Kamail, 2002 FCT 381 [Kamail]—all of which endorse
potentially indefinite detention on grounds of absence of cooperation, and all of which fail to even consider the
possibility that the alleged lack of cooperation may be explicable or justifiable. While it could be argued that a
detainee has other avenues of relief under Canadian immigration law that obviate the necessity or justification for
1
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the detention regime’s purported goal of furthering immigration control, is instead serving as a
disciplinary technology.
Further, despite the serious implications, both legal and otherwise, of findings of noncooperation, we find that the case law suffers from a lack of coherent principles underpinning the
use of non-cooperation as a justification for continuing an individual’s immigration detention.
Because of this absence of a clear legal basis for the findings in question, the concept remains
troublingly vague and often appears to be applied in an unprincipled and heterogenous manner.
This is problematic in many respects. Most importantly, it is problematic because this concept
has been used to provide a basis to justify indefinite detention—which is, at least on its face,
contrary to the Charter and Canada’s international legal obligations.4 Further, the unprincipled
nature of these judgments makes it difficult for detained individuals to challenge them,
facilitating the state’s ability to use non-cooperation as tool of discipline and punishment.
Finally, these judgments appear to accept, without stating so explicitly, that immigration
detention is not meant solely to serve as a mechanism of furthering immigration control, but
rather has a disciplinary dimension.
In Part I, this article considers the critiques that have been made of the purposes served
by immigration detention before proceeding to an analysis of non-cooperation and immigration
detention grounded in Foucault’s writings on power and the disciplinary society and Garland’s
work on crime control in the modern era. In Part II, this article reviews the legislative framework
for immigration detention in Canada and examines the role of non-cooperation within that
framework. In Part III, this article reviews the Canadian case law on non-cooperation,
highlighting the ways in which non-cooperation continues to be applied by the courts in an
incoherent and subjective manner that uncritically rationalizes the indefinite detention of
migrants. In Part IV, this article sets out an argument as to the indefensibility of the
jurisprudential trend towards non-cooperation as a basis for long-term detention. Finally, in Part
V, this article explores potential reforms and ways forward. In particular, we note that some
jurisdictions have developed specific legal norms which mitigate the risk of immigration
detention serving disciplinary or punitive ends. We argue that if non-cooperation is going to
continue to serve as a factor in the reasoning of Canadian tribunals and courts in the immigration
detention context, it must do so in a way that coheres with the relevant legislative scheme, the
Charter, and international law.

non-cooperation in their own deportation (for example, seeking an additional Pre-Removal Risk Assessments
(PRRA) or making a Humanitarian & Compassionate Application), such an argument fails to account for the de
facto absence of meaningful remedies for most detainees facing sustained removal efforts. While it is beyond the
scope of this article, the reality is that the legal mechanisms that exist to prevent return to countries where these
individuals may face mistreatment or hardship, are, at best, imperfect, and that migrants face numerous access to
justice barriers (such as cost and access to counsel) in even effectively accessing those mechanisms—particularly
from detention. In many cases, detainees may have exhausted all of their reasonably available recourses and still
have a genuine fear of the conditions that await them on removal or have children or other family members in
Canada from whom they do not wish to be separated.
4
The constitutionality of Canada’s immigration detention regime was recently addressed in Brown v Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration, 2020 FCA 130 [Brown FCA]. In addressing the constitutionality of the lack of time
limits on immigration detention, the Court briefly addressed the issue of non-cooperation, noting that “[d]etention
cannot be ordered on the basis of non-cooperation alone—to do so would be contrary to sections 7 and 9 [of the
Charter].”
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I. NON-COOPERATION AND THE DISCIPLINARY SOCIETY
A. THE AMBIGUITY OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION
In her seminal 2014 work, Inside Immigration Detention, Mary Bosworth underscored the
fundamental lack of “clear, inherent purpose or legitimacy” of immigration detention centres.5
This indictment of the British immigration detention system was based on Bosworth’s extensive
fieldwork inside six immigration removal centres [IRCs] in the UK which revealed that, despite
being called “removal centres,” a growing number of immigration detainees held in IRCs in the
UK were being detained for prolonged periods of time, and sometimes released back into the
community.6
Arjen Leerkes and Dennis Broeders have levelled a similar critique, pointing to three
phenomena that the purported purpose of immigration detention (i.e., the enactment of border
control, principally through deportation) fails to account for in the Netherlands: (1) since the
early 1990s there has been a steady increase in the use of immigration detention, while the
numbers of deportations have decreased; (2) the average length of immigration detention has
increased in recent years; and (3) if the state is unable to deport migrant detainees, they are
released back into society. 7
These critiques are instructive for purposes of an analysis of the Canadian immigration
detention system, which, like the UK and the Netherlands, suffers from a similar crisis of
legitimacy regarding its purpose and role in the immigration system. 8 A few preliminary
observations regarding the Canadian immigration system help to contextualize these concerns for
the purposes of this article.
First, though a significant proportion of immigration detention in Canada occurs on
arrival for periods of approximately three weeks or less, a not insignificant number of individuals
are detained pending deportation and some of them for lengthy periods of time—anywhere from
ninety days to upwards of seven years. The CBSA’s own statistics for the fiscal year 2016-2017
reveal that 439 non-citizens were detained that year for ninety days or more. This article focuses
on a particular subset of immigration detention cases, where detention is linked to findings of
non-cooperation. Of the twenty-one non-cooperation cases analyzed for purposes of this article,
all but two involved instances of long-term detention (i.e., more than ninety days) and, in most
cases, the purported rationale for detention was deportation procedures. In several instances of
detention involving non-cooperation, the detained individual was not removed from Canada and
was instead released into Canadian society. 9
Second, and relatedly, Canadian courts take the position that immigration detention is
non-punitive and must be “hinged” to an immigration purpose (often, though not always,

5

Mary Bosworth, Inside Immigration Detention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 85.
Ibid at 5-14.
7
Arjen Leerkes & Dennis Broeders, “A cased of mixed motives: formal and informal functions of administrative
detention” (2010) 50 Brit J Crim 830 at 831.
8
Immigration and Refugee Board, “Report of the 2017/2018 External Audit (Detention Review)” (20 July 2018)
<irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/transparency/reviews-audit-evaluations/Pages/ID-external-audit-1718.aspx>.
9
See e.g. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Panahi-Darghaloo, 2010 FC 647 [Panahi 2010];
Toure ONSC, supra note 3; Ali ONSC, supra note 2; Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v
Chipovalov, 2017 FC 623 [Chipovalov]; Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Paul
Rooney, 2016 FC 1097 [Rooney].
6
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removal).10 However, this insistence on the non-punitive nature of immigration detention is hard
to square with the experiences of individuals who find themselves behind bars for lengthy
periods of time in provincial penitentiaries, comingled with individuals serving criminal
sentences or detained pending trial, oftentimes only to be released back into Canadian society.11
When it comes to long-term detention resulting from non-cooperation, Bosworth,
Leerkes, and Broeders’ observations as to the ambiguity around the purpose of detention are thus
relevant in the Canadian context. In short, their observations regarding immigration detention
should prompt us to ask: can it really be the case that long-term detention of uncooperative noncitizens furthers immigration control, or are there other underlying motives? If so, what are they?

B. COERCION AND DISCIPLINARY POWER
In order to answer this question, it necessary to acknowledge that detention for non-cooperation
is fundamentally about coercion—an argument that will be further fleshed out in Part IV of this
article. Where non-cooperation is cited as a justification for continuing detention, the language
adopted in the case law reveals that detention is being wielded to coerce certain behaviour from
the detainee and thus achieve a certain outcome—whether that be signing a travel document,
divulging the name of a birth parent, etcetera.
What is the justification or rationale for this coercion? Legal theorists have argued that
the coercive powers of the state are justified on a social contract-like basis. In brief, state
coercion constitutes an incursion into the autonomy of the individual—a principle of primary
importance in the liberal democratic state 12—and can only be justified where the state acts to
protect the autonomy of its citizens through the (re)distribution of resources. 13 However, non10

See e.g. Brown FCA, supra note 4 at paras 42-43; Chaudhary v Canada, 2015 ONSC 1503 at para 5; Alvin Brown
v Ministry of Public Safety, 2016 ONSC 7760 at para 102; Ali ONSC, supra note 2 at para 26.
11
There are only three Immigration Holding Centres (IHCs) in Canada: one in the Toronto area, one in the Montreal
area, and one that opened in March 2020 in the Vancouver area (a fourth facility at the Vancouver airport is only for
detentions of forty-eight hours or less). As a result, anyone who is arrested in Ontario, Quebec, or British Columbia
is assessed by the CBSA for holding at an IHC via a tool called the “National Risk Assessment for Detention”
(NRAD), an opaque process by which the CBSA identifies the risk an individual may pose in detention for the
purposes of determining the most appropriate detention placement. CBSA’s enforcement manual on detention
(<www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/resources/manuals/enf/enf20-det-en.pdf>
[perma.cc/9BQZ-TG32]) states that: “(the IHC should always be the default detention facility if risk can be
mitigated, in regions where those facilities are available. Individuals detained under the IRPA who have scored 0 to
4 points and 5 to 9 points (if risk can be mitigated in an IHC) on the NRAD form [BSF754] should be held in an
IHC.” Detainees who are not held in IHCs are generally detained in provincial penitentiaries, where they are
comingled with individuals awaiting criminal trial or serving sentences after trial. Various theorists have pointed out
the punitive nature of immigration detention, regardless of whether it is formally understood as such. See e.g. Cesar
Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, “Immigration detention as punishment” (2014) 61:5 UCLA L Rev 1346; Janet
Cleveland, “Not so short and sweet: Immigration detention in Canada,” in A Nethery & SJ Silverman, eds,
Immigration Detention: The migration of a policy and its human impact (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2015); Izabella
Majcher, “Discipline and punish? Analysis of the purposes of immigration detention in Europe” (2015) 11:2
AmeriQuests.
12
See Michael Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy” (2001) 30:3 Philosophy & Public
Affairs 1 at 266-272, building on Immanuel Kant and Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986) at 376–78. Blake also references John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing,
1978) and Martha Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach” in Martha Nussbaum & Amartya
Sen, eds, The Quality of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) at 224–69 for arguments as to the importance
of individual autonomy.
13
Ibid, Blake at 280-282.
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citizens, by virtue of their lack of formal membership in the nation state, are excluded to varying
degrees from this social contract depending on their immigration status, and the coercionautonomy trade-off is therefore disrupted—which means that coercion has to be understood
differently when it is enacted upon non-citizens. An immigration detainee, in particular, is
clearly excluded from the autonomy-coercion-(re)distribution model, having been forcibly
removed from society through the deprivation of their liberty. The formal explanation for this
form of coercion is that it is carried out in order to further the mechanisms of border control—
but the long-term nature of the instances of detention analyzed for this article, in addition to the
fact that various of the detainees in question were ultimately released from detention and not
deported, reveal that border control is not actually always occurring when a non-citizen is
detained. How then is the state’s coercion into the most fundamental aspect of the autonomy of
an immigration detainee—their freedom–justified, or at least explained?
Foucault’s writings on the disciplinary society are particularly apt in this regard. The
disciplinary society produces the transgressor, just as the prison produces the punishable subject.
Disciplinary power, Foucault observes, “separates, analyses, differentiates, carries its procedures
of decomposition to the point of necessary and sufficient single units …. Discipline ‘makes’
individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as
instruments of its exercise.” 14 Reliance on non-cooperation in order to justify continuing
detention is an exercise in disciplining, individualizing power, forcibly abstracting individuals
from the broader global context in which they have committed their alleged transgressions. It is
an uncomfortable and oft unspoken truth that immigration detention is, in large part, a product of
global inequality—which is itself generally a product of colonial and postcolonial histories and
realities. Immigration detention in nation states like Canada repeatedly subjugates citizens of the
global south who have dared to transgress international borders fixed by those in power, finding
themselves on the wrong side of the geopolitical lines that the powerful have drawn and redrawn
since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.
Non-cooperative migrants, by refusing to submit to the coercive forces of the state, have
thus proved themselves to be undisciplinable subjects. And this in an age when the reification of
borders makes “irregular” border crossers the ultimate transgressors. In denuding the state of its
ability to maintain the fiction of border control by expelling those who have been legally cast out
of the nation state, the non-cooperative migrant reveals the discomfiting ineffectiveness at the
heart of the border control regime. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising in the face of this apparent
flouting of sovereignty that the reaction of the state is so harsh—which is apparent from the
strong language of Canadian courts in the non-cooperation case law that we review in this
article.15
David Garland’s writings on crime and social control are also instructive for purposes of
this analysis of the animating forces behind non-cooperation jurisprudence, and immigration
detention more generally. Building on Foucault’s work on the performative nature of punishment
in the pre-industrial era, Garland observes that in the face of general insecurity deriving from the
14

Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995) at 170.
For example, in Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Fankem, 2019 FC 186 [Fankem] at para
7, Justice Bell of the Federal Court observed of the detainee that he “considers himself to be the director of a play
and Canadian authorities are but actors subject to his direction.” In Canada (Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness) v Lunyamila, 2016 FC 1199 428 at paras 4 and 58, Chief Justice Crampton of the Federal Court set
aside five release decisions by the Immigration Division, observing that the detainee was effectively attempting to
“take the law into his own hands.” These are just two examples of the type of language utilized by the Courts in
relation to “noncooperative” migrants.
15
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precarity of social and economic relations in late modern society, which is understood to be a
product of the failure of the state to deliver physical and economic security, American and
British legislatures have instituted measures that are designed to be “expressive, cathartic
actions, undertaken to denounce the crime and reassure the public,” in so doing downplaying
“the complexities and long-term character of effective crime control in favour of the immediate
gratifications of a more expressive alternative.” 16
Garland’s observations, scaled up, are easily applicable to the immigration detention
regime. The same social and economic insecurity identified by Garland is, in the immigration
context, linked to societal fears related to globalization and the associated weakening of state
sovereignty in the 21st century—and as Catherine Dauvergne has pointed out, state efforts to
remain relevant in the age of globalization are largely staked out in the texts and politics of
migration regulation.17 As a result, the weakening of state sovereignty, instead of being blamed
on economic forces such as the rise of multinational corporations and the increasingly
unrestrained cross-border flows of goods and currency, is blamed on the state’s failure to control
the flow of “risky” or “dangerous” migrants.18 It has therefore become a political imperative for
nation states like Canada to institute policies and legislative change that, as Garland puts it,
denounce the perceived transgressions committed by migrants and reassure the public that border
controls are, in fact, effective. What this has meant is more stringent controls on migrants,
detention being the most extreme form of such controls, allowing the state to telegraph the
message to its citizens that it is “in control over the geographical (and social) borders that
citizens want to maintain.”19

C. NON-COOPERATION AS RESISTANCE
A theoretical explanation of the role of the state vis-à-vis an uncooperative migrant would be
incomplete without an inquiry into the role of the uncooperative migrant vis-à-vis the state—for
despite the disciplining and individualizing power of the state, the migrant retains some degree
of agency which must be recognized. While some cases of non-cooperation may partly be tied to
cognitive or mental health issues,20 it is not the case that all instances of non-cooperation are
16

David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2001 at 133-134.
17
Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and the Law (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 44, referring to Sundhya Pahuja, “‘Normalizing’ Pathologies of Difference:
The Discursive Functions of International Monetary Fund Conditionality,” in Lyndsay M Campbell et al, eds,
International Intersections: Law’s Changing Territories: Papers Presented at Green College, University of British
Columbia, April 3-May 2, 1998 (Vancouver, British Columbia, Faculty of Law, Graduate Program, 1998) at 81.
Migration is fundamental to the project of nation building, insofar as it is essential to creating and defining the
population that constitutes the nation.
18
Multiple theorists have identified the largely post-9/11 discursive, rhetorical, and political shifts towards the
perception of migrants as “risky” and “dangerous.” See e.g. Bridget Anderson, Us and Them?: The Dangerous
Politics of Immigration Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Anna Pratt, Securing Borders: Detention
and Deportation in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2005); Audrey Macklin, “Borderline
Security” in Ronald J Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach, eds, The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s
Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
19
Leerkes & Broeders, supra note 6 at 843.
20
In six of the cases we analyzed, the mental health or cognitive ability of the detainee was mentioned by the Court
in the course of the decision (Chipovalov, supra note 8; Fankem, supra note 14; Lunyamila, supra note 3; Toure
ONCA, supra note 3;, Rooney, supra note 8; Toure ONSC, supra note 3).
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attributable to cognitive impairment or mental health. It is therefore worth treating the so-called
“uncooperative” behaviour of migrants as theoretically instructive—for doing so brings us back
to the role of coercion in the migrant–state relationship.
Antje Ellerman, in an article on resistance and the liberal state, makes a useful
observation about the nature of non-cooperation as resistance. 21 She argues that the nature of the
liberal state “exposes a critical space for resistance that is unique to liberal states,” the reason for
this being the liberal state’s “self-limited sovereignty,” which includes the “self-imposed
curtailment of its coercive powers.” 22 Because the power of the liberal state is premised first and
foremost upon voluntary compliance, which depends upon the availability of meaningful
incentives that ensure that the benefits of compliance outweigh its costs, and in the alternative,
coercion, which is constitutionally constrained, it is “those individuals with the weakest claims
against the liberal state—who cannot be offered any incentives for compliance—who are able to
constrain its exercise of sovereignty.” 23 Migrants who refuse to provide identifying information
to immigration authorities prevent the state from exercising its sovereign power, insofar as
deportation is contingent on the possession of identity documents.24 As a result, Ellerman
contends that the state is therefore limited in its exercise of coercion against the individual.
Therefore, and counterintuitively, it is “those individuals who have the weakest claims against
the liberal state that are most able to constrain its exercise of sovereignty.” 25
The stalemate identified in the case law between the state and the uncooperative migrant
is, therefore, not simply an instance of the state asserting its disciplining power over the migrant,
but also an instance of the migrant asserting their power over the state—even if that assertion of
power results in a complete deprivation of liberty and years spent behind bars.

II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR NON-COOPERATION AS
JUSTIFICATION FOR DETENTION
This article is not intended to provide a comprehensive overview of the legal structure of
immigration detention in Canada. 26 However, some context is necessary to situate the
“uncooperative” migrant within the scheme of Canadian immigration detention law and practice
and to show that non-cooperation is a principle that has little statutory support. This section
highlights the general absence of a statutory obligation to cooperate in one’s own deportation. It
then provides an overview of the immigration detention legal regime in Canada, identifying the
relevant provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR)27 that bear directly on questions of non-cooperation.

Antje Ellermann, “Undocumented Migrants and Resistance in the Liberal State” (2010) 38:3 Politics & Society
408.
22
Ibid at 409.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid at 414-415.
25
Ibid at 409.
26
For a more detailed review of this issue, see Siena Anstis, Jared Will & Joshua Blum, “Separate but Unequal:
Immigration Detention in Canada and the Great Writ of Liberty” (2018) 63:2 McGill LJ 1 at 8–18.
27
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, [IRPA]; Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR].
21
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A. THE ABSENCE OF A STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO COOPERATE
WITH ONE’S OWN DEPORTATION
Under the IRPA and the IRPR, the obligation to provide information or otherwise cooperate with
immigration authorities begins and ends with a person’s claim for refugee protection in Canada,
a formal application to enter Canada, or a formal application to remain in Canada (ss 15-18 of
IRPA).28 The IRPR specify that the “examination” in which the person is obliged to cooperate
ends when there is a decision on the application or claim for protection. 29 Thus, individuals who
are detained for removal and are not making an application to remain in Canada are generally
under no statutory obligation to answer questions or cooperate with immigration authorities. This
is the situation for all of the non-cooperation cases reviewed in this article—the absence of
cooperation related to removal and not to any application to enter or remain in Canada. Thus,
contrary to the untethered assertions in the case law, there is generally no statutory duty to
facilitate one’s own deportation. 30
Further, even if there is an arguable obligation to cooperate located in the IRPA other
than at ss 15-18 of the IRPA, this is not clearly spelled out in the relevant case law. The severe
deprivation of liberty entailed by immigration detention must mean, at the very least, that the
obligation to cooperate in a given instance is specified and located within the legislative scheme,
and that this is clearly articulated by tribunals and courts.
A potential caveat to this is found in section 127(a) of the IRPA, which provides that no
person shall knowingly “directly or indirectly misrepresent or withhold material facts relating to
a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error in the administration of this Act”
[emphasis added].31 Thus, if the alleged absence of cooperation could induce an error in the
administration of the IRPA through the withholding or misrepresentation of facts, then such lack
of cooperation constitutes a contravention of the IRPA. The provision does not cover all conduct
that frustrates deportation, as the inability to deport is not an “error” in the administration of the
IRPA. Further, this provision captures only a subset of the kinds of conduct that are alleged as
non-cooperation against detainees. 32 Moreover, if section 127(a) of the IRPA is in fact the source
of the purported obligation to cooperate, none of the court or tribunal decisions reviewed for
purposes of this article cited that provision of the IRPA as such.
A further potential caveat is section 58(1)(d) of the IRPA, which authorizes detention on
identity grounds where the Minister “is of the opinion” that a foreign national’s identity has not
been, but may be, established. 33 This is discussed in more detail below. However, it is worth
IRPA, ibid at ss 15-18. See further IRPR, ibid at s 10, which makes clear that an “application” exists only where a
number of formalities are met, and does not come into existence by the mere expression of a desire to enter or
remain.
29
IRPR, ibid at s 37.
30
Perhaps most egregiously in Dadzie, supra note 3 at para 52, where the Superior Court baldly states that the
“applicant has a statutory obligation to cooperate with CBSA” yet fails to cite any statutory basis for that obligation.
31
IRPA, supra note 25 at s 127(a).
32
For example, the refusal to sign a declaration of voluntary return, the refusal to sign a travel document application,
the refusal to provide DNA sample or fingerprints and the refusal to consent to publications of one’s photograph—
which have constituted the basis of non-cooperation findings—would arguably not be captured within the scope of
this provision as they do not constitute misrepresentation or the withholding of a material fact.
33
IRPA, supra note 25 at s 58(1)(d). In Brown FCA, supra note 4 at para 99, the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA)
held that non-cooperation as the sole basis of detention would constitute a violation of the Charter. However, it
noted that where “the impasse in effecting removal is disputed identity and the detainee has refused to cooperate in
confirming their identity, delays in removal cannot count against the Minister. Release in these circumstances would
28
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noting that out of the twenty-one decisions we analyzed, identity was either raised and/or held to
be a ground of detention in only four cases.34 In every other instance, the Minister did not allege
that identity had not been established.
Additionally, and importantly, the fact that certain conduct or omissions are criminalized
under the IRPA does not per se create a statutory obligation to act—it merely exposes the person
concerned to prosecution and penalty if the elements of the offence are proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.35 The maximum available penalty for such conduct or omission is
imprisonment of five years.36 However, where absence of cooperation is invoked to justify
continued detention, detention may be, and in some cases has been, maintained for far longer
than the person concerned could have been imprisoned for a breach of section 127(a) of the
IRPA. For example, in the detentions of Mr. Ali and Mr. Warssama, discussed in greater detail
below, allegations of lack of cooperation served to justify detentions (seven years and five years,
respectively) far longer than they would have faced had they been convicted under section 127(a)
of the IRPA.
Moreover, Mr. Warssama’s refusal to sign a declaration of voluntary return falls outside
of the ambit of section 127(a) of the IRPA as it cannot amount to withholding a material fact and
did not induce an error in the administration of the Act.37 His non-cooperation—a refusal to sign
what would have been a false declaration of voluntariness—was nonetheless repeatedly invoked
to justify his detention of over five years.38 Mr. Ali was detained for seven years before a court
ruled on the Minister’s allegation of non-cooperation in the form of withholding material facts.
In the context of Mr. Ali’s habeas corpus application, the court found that this allegation was
based on mere speculation and could not be sustained.39

B. THE IRPA AND IPRR DETENTION REGIME AND NONCOOPERATION
It is against this backdrop—the absence of a clearly delineated legal obligation under the IRPA to
cooperate with one’s own deportation—that the role of non-cooperation under the detention
provisions must be examined. In the absence of a statutory obligation to cooperate with one’s
encourage detainees to be less than forthcoming. Where a detainee is uncooperative, detention cannot be classified
as indefinite because it is within the detainee’s control to change their destiny.” What the FCA fails to grapple with
is the fact that in the majority of non-cooperation cases, identity is not at issue – and tribunals and courts are
therefore relying on non-cooperation as a factor in situations that go beyond disputed identity. Further, as we discuss
later in this article, the FCA—like the Federal Court—fails to critically engage with the concept of non-cooperation,
omitting to consider, for example, the vagueness of the concept of noncooperation when it is relied upon by courts
and the CBSA as a basis upon which to rationalize lengthy or indefinite detentions and the impact on the detainee.
34
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Gill, 2003 FC 1398; Rooney, supra note 8; Canada (Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Iyile, 2009 FC 700; Igbinosa v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), 2008 FC 1372.
35
IRPA, supra note 25 at s 124, which makes any contravention of the Act or any failure to comply with a condition
or obligation imposed under the Act a criminal offence, where a penalty is not otherwise specifically provided.
Similarly, s 126 makes it a criminal offence to counsel, induce, aid, or abet any of the behaviours captured by s 124.
36
IRPA, supra note 25 at s 128(2).
37
Warssama, supra note 1 at para 1.
38
Ibid.
39
Ali, supra note 2, at paras 23, 33, where the Court not only dismissed the allegation of non-cooperation, but also
found that, in the criminal sentencing context, his detention in such conditions would have counted as more than a
decade of imprisonment.
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own deportation, any invocation of the failure to do so as a justification for detention should give
us pause. Assuming that a detainee is in fact deliberately refusing to cooperate with the processes
CBSA is engaging in order to carry out deportation, it is safe to assume that they are doing so
because ultimately, they do not wish to be deported, or to consent to their own deportation. The
state’s use of detention as a coercive mechanism to force such cooperation must be justified in
light of the principles animating the IRPA, the Charter, and Canada’s international legal
obligations.
Canadian courts have recognized that those accused of crimes cannot be forced to
incriminate themselves and that this right flows from the norms requiring “respect for
human dignity and free choice” [emphasis added].40 The Supreme Court has, in fact, sought to
delineate the scope of the protection against self-incrimination with reference to the “underlying
notions of dignity and fairness” that animate it. 41 In short, individuals have a right not to be
enlisted in the state’s efforts to deprive them of their liberty. This right flows from a recognition
that compelling someone to act in such a manner is an affront their inherent dignity. The
uncooperative migrant, on the other hand, faces indefinite detention in Canada if they refuse to
assist the state in its efforts to violate their personal autonomy and fundamental life choices by
deporting them from the country.
More specifically, we argue that the state of the law on non-cooperation is explained, at
least in part, by the fact that courts have not even seen the necessity of articulating or defining a
legal duty to cooperate, much less a rights-based justification for detention on that basis. It is
implicitly accepted that such detention is necessary and therefore defensible.42

C. COOPERATION WHEN DETAINED ON IDENTTIY GROUNDS
Once a non-citizen is arrested pursuant to the IRPA and held for more than forty-eight hours, it
falls to the Division to hold regular hearings to determine whether continued detention is
justified. The Division is required to release an individual unless “satisfied” that: (a) the
individual is a danger to the public; (b) the individual is unlikely to appear for removal or an
immigration proceeding; (c) the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is taking
the necessary steps to inquire into a reasonable suspicion that the individual is inadmissible on
the grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality, criminality
or organized criminality; or (d) the Minister “is of the opinion” that a foreign national’s identity
has not been, but may be, established.43
In the latter case, section 58(1)(d) of the IRPA provides for the possibility of continued
detention in cases where the authorities are not satisfied with respect to the identity of the person
40

R v Hart, 2014 SCC 52 at paras 171, 175.
British Columbia Securities Commission v Branch, 1995 CanLII 142 (SCC) at para 77 (as per L’Heureux-Dubé J).
In R v Stillman, [1997] 1 SCR 607 at para 209, McLachlin J (as she then was) dissented because she refused to
acknowledge that the taking of bodily samples fell within the scope of the protection against self-incrimination,
which she found to be limited to a “prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications,” adopting the view of the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v California, 384 US 757
(1966).
42
This was recently underlined by the FCA in Brown FCA, supra note 4 at para 99, where the FCA adopted a
similar position to the Federal Court in the decisions reviewed for this article—namely that allowing a detainee to
‘not cooperate’ would vest them with too much power vis-à-vis the state and that indefinite detention of a
noncooperative detainee where identity is disputed is therefore compliant with the legislative scheme.
43
IRPA, supra note 25 at s 58(1).
41
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concerned and the detainee has “not reasonably cooperated with the Minister by providing
relevant information for the purpose of establishing their identity.”44 Thus, while the provision
does not establish an obligation to cooperate in one’s own deportation, it does expressly
empower the Division to maintain detention where an individual refuses to cooperate with efforts
to establish identity, which are in practice closely tied with efforts to deport.
The IRPR provide a non-exhaustive list of factors that the Division must consider when
assessing whether or not the detainee has “reasonably cooperated” here—essentially the
provision of reasonably available travel and identity documents and consistent biographical
information as well as a willingness to sign a travel document application. 45 Importantly, even if
the identity ground is made out, the Division is still required to consider release and alternatives
to detention.46 In other words, release is still legally available even if the Division finds that the
detainee is not cooperating with efforts to establish identity.
Given its explicit mention under this section of the IRPA and definition in the IRPR, one
could easily think that this would be the situation in which absence of cooperation is most
frequently and successfully invoked in order to justify continued immigration detention.
However, this is not the case. In fact, the identity ground for detention is relatively infrequently
relied upon.47 It was not a ground of detention in most of the long-term detention cases reviewed
in this article. Instead, these long-term immigration detainees were held on grounds of either
flight risk or danger to the public or a combination of the two.48 In those cases, section 58(1)(d)
of the IRPA is inoperative and there is no statutory basis for detention on the basis of noncooperation.49
The absence of a statutory basis for detention in these cases has spawned a certain degree
of judicial creativity. In one of the judgments that most forcefully endorsed indefinite detention
on grounds of absence of cooperation, Justice Clark of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
found that Mr. Dadzie’s detention was justified in light of the statutory obligation to cooperate
when detained on identity grounds even though Mr. Dadzie was not detained on identity
grounds,50 as expressly acknowledged just a few paragraphs earlier in the judgment. 51 In Canada
(MPSEP) v Fankem, Justice Bell expressly held that it was unreasonable for the Division to
“disregard the fact that identity is an issue,” even where s 58(1)(d) of the IRPA is not invoked as
a ground of detention.52 This holding is particularly hard to understand given that the language of
44

Notably, it is only the Minister, and not the adjudicator at the Division, who must be of the opinion that identity is
not established. The Division has no jurisdiction to determine whether or not identity has in fact been satisfactorily
established.
45
IRPR, supra note 25 at s 247(1).
46
Until recently, the Guideline to Division Members inexplicably provided that Members must be particularly
cautious in such cases—a warning not found with respect to the other grounds for detention: see Canada,
Immigration and Refugee Board, Chairperson’s Guidelines, 2: Detention (5 June 2013). The updated 2019 version
of Guideline 2 no longer contains such language: see Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board, Chairperson’s
Guidelines, 2: Detention (1 April 2019).
47
Brown v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 710 (Evidence, Affidavit of John Helsdon at
paras 8-11, which provides statistics concerning grounds of detention) [Brown FC].
48
See Part III of the Article below.
49
While it is undeniable that non-cooperation could constitute evidence that the detainee poses a flight risk if
released (because they have made clear that they do not wish to comply), the point here is that the statutory
obligation to cooperate in one’s own removal evaporates where the detention is not sought on identity grounds.
50
Dadzie, supra note 3 at paras 63, 65.
51
Ibid at para 59.
52
Fankem, supra note 14 at para 9.
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the IRPA confers virtually unfettered discretion upon the Minister, and not the Immigration
Division, to determine whether a detainee’s identity is established. 53 While the judgment is brief,
its implications are dramatic: it solidifies the proposition that the failure to cooperate in the
establishment of identity, even where the Minister is no longer advancing identity as a ground of
detention, can justify the continuation of detention even in the express absence of a statutory
duty to cooperate in that respect.

D. COOPERATION IN OTHER CASES
As noted above, it is in cases of detention on grounds other than identity that non-cooperation
has been most frequently invoked to justify lengthy detentions in Canada. It is in these cases that
section 248 of the IRPR becomes critical.
The factors listed under section 248 of the IRPR were added to the Regulations as a result
of the Federal Court’s decision in Sahin v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).54
In Sahin, the applicant argued that his continued detention was contrary to sections 7 and 12 of
the Charter.55 Justice Rothstein (then of the Federal Court Trial Division) concluded that
“indefinite detention” could violate section 7 of the Charter. He went on to provide a nonexhaustive list of factors to consider in making detention decisions, noting that their relative
weight would vary in each case. Among the factors noted by Justice Rothstein were whether “the
applicant or respondent caused any delay or has … not been as diligent as reasonably possible”
and whether that “[u]nexplained delay and even unexplained lack of diligence” ought to count
against the offending party. 56 In reviewing the Sahin factors in Charkaoui v Canada, the
Supreme Court of Canada endorsed these factors.57 The current version of section 248 of the
IRPR reads as follows:
If it is determined that there are grounds for detention, the following factors shall be considered
before a decision is made on detention or release:

(a) the reason for detention;
(b) the length of time in detention;
(c) whether there are any elements that can assist in determining the length of time that detention
is likely to continue and, if so, that length of time;

(d) any unexplained delays or unexplained lack of diligence caused by the Department, the
Canada Border Services Agency or the person concerned; and

(e) the existence of alternatives to detention.58
In detention cases, non-cooperation is most frequently applied through section 248(d) of the
IRPR: the detainee’s lack of cooperation is alleged to be the cause of the “unexplained” delay in

53

IRPA, supra note 25 at s 58(d).
Sahin v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] 1 FCR 214 [Sahin].
55
Ibid at para 13.
56
Ibid at para 30.
57
Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration Canada), 2007 SCC 9 at para 108 [Charkaoui].
58
IRPR, supra note 25 at s 248 [emphasis added].
54
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deportation or to be a “lack of diligence,” pursuant to which the Division and the court then find
that non-cooperation favours continued detention.59
Section 248(d) of the IRPR applies whenever the Division finds that any of the grounds
for detention enumerated in section 58(1) of the IRPA are made out and is not limited to
detention on identity grounds. As a result, the more defined and constrained statutory framework
of what constitutes non-cooperation that applies only in cases of detention on identity grounds
has had a very limited role in practice. Instead, most often a broad and unrestricted notion of
non-cooperation is applied through the lens of section 248(d) of the IRPR to justify continued
detention.60
Further, as revealed in the review of the jurisprudence below, very little regard is had for
the requirement that the “delay” caused by non-cooperation be unexplained as required by the
express wording of section 248(d) of the IRPR. While the clear language indicates that a
detainee’s explanation for their refusal to cooperate has to be considered, this has not been the
case in practice. In fact, the reasons for which detainees have refused to cooperate—for example,
because they were being asked to stipulate that their removal was voluntary when that was not
the case,61 or in cases where the detainee had expressed a fear of torture or persecution upon
removal62—have been excluded from consideration.
Even more problematic, both conceptually and in practice, is the fact that the functional
and historical purpose of section 248(d) is to protect the Charter rights of detainees, as it is
among the factors that the Division has been required to consider in order to ensure that
detainees are not held indefinitely in breach of their rights under section 7 of the Charter. As
noted above, section 248 of the IRPR was enacted to give effect to the factors enunciated by the
Federal Court in Sahin in order to ensure that “detention decisions [are] made with section 7
Charter considerations in mind.”63 As seen in the cases reviewed below, however, section 248(d)
of the IRPR, though drafted as a shield to protect the Charter rights of detainees, has become a
sword in the Minister’s hand to justify continued detention.64

III. THE ABSENCE OF COOPERATION AND
JURISPRUDENTIAL TRENDS
This section reviews the case law addressing lack of cooperation and attempts to identify some
trends in this murky area. We have divided the case law into two broad conceptual categories.
59

See the cases reviewed in Part III of the Article below.
The FCA’s decision in Brown FCA, supra note 4 at para 99, suggests that basing detention on non-cooperation
outside the context of disputed identity would be problematic.
61
See Warssama, supra note 1 and Panahi 2010, supra note 8. While ultimately successful on judicial review, both
Mr. Warssama’s and Mr. Panahi-Dargahloo’s refusals to falsely state that their deportation was voluntary were the
basis for their lengthy detentions by the Division.
62
Kamail, supra note 3.
63
Sahin, supra note 49 at para 29. The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement [RIAS] concerning the final version of
the IRPR as promulgated in 2002 specifically states that “[t]hese provisions are in keeping with fundamental justice,
procedural fairness, Canadian values and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Codifying factors and conditions in
regulation promotes consistency, clarity and transparency in decision making”: Regulatory Impact Analysis
Statement (IRPR), (2002) C Gaz 2, 306 (EXTRA Vol 136, No 9). See also Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v
B046, 2011 FC 877 at para 54.
64
A similar phenomenon has been observed in the criminal law context, where courts have shown a tendency to
presume the existence of state powers in the negative spaces left unprotected by Charter rights. See, for example, R
v Mann, 2004 SCC 52. See also RJ Delisle, “Judicial Creation of Police Powers” (1993) 20 CR (4th) 29.
60
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The first category captures judicial approaches where non-cooperation is either the decisive or
the paramount factor in analyzing whether a detention has become unlawful. The second
category captures decisions that generally conclude that indefinite detention cannot be justified
by lack of cooperation and that release may be required regardless of the detainee’s alleged lack
of cooperation. As we argue below, the commonalities between the two camps are as instructive
as the differences.

A. THE ABSENCE OF COOPERATION TRUMPS ALL OTHER FACTORS
The first category of cases stands on the proposition that non-cooperation will justify any
duration of continued detention because that detention is caused by the detainee’s uncooperative
behaviour.65 In other words, both the length of time already spent in detention and its indefinite
future duration are considered to be the fault of the detainee and this fault justifies what might
otherwise be considered an unlawful lengthy or indefinite detention. Because the detainee is
perceived to hold the key to their own release, the detention is characterized as neither indefinite
nor unjust. Each of the judgments in this first category starts from the premise that detainees are
obliged to cooperate with their own removal process, though they provide virtually no analysis
of the source of this obligation.
The judgments that have adopted this approach have also failed to consider the reasons
for the lack of cooperative behaviour and do not consider whether there is (or should be) some
kind of objective benchmark against which detainee behaviour can be assessed to determine
cooperativeness. For example, in quashing a release order for a detainee who could not be
removed because he refused to sign a travel document application, the Federal Court held that
the “detainee was the sole cause of the indefinite nature of the detention.”66 An Ontario Superior
Court judgment came down even more emphatically on this point, finding that “[w]here, as here,
the applicant’s detention is, in effect, self-imposed (because Mr. Dadzie chooses not to cooperate
with the CBSA in any productive manner), he cannot rely on his own obstructionist tactics to
argue that his detention constitutes a breach of his Charter rights.”67
Underpinning all of the judgments that exemplify this approach is a concern that to hold
otherwise would reward or incentivize uncooperative behaviour and that such behaviour should
be disciplined. As stated in what has been the touchstone case for this school of thought, “[t]o
hold otherwise would be to encourage deportees to be as uncooperative as possible as a means to

65

See Kamail, supra note 3 at paras 33, 35; Dadzie, supra note 3 at paras 55, 60, 65, 78; Lunyamila, supra note 3 at
paras 2, 58–59.
66
Kamail, supra note 3 at para 35.
67
Dadzie, supra note 3 at para 60. This point is made several times in the decision (see also para 78). The same
finding was made in the case of Mr. Toure, where O’Marra J refused release and found that the detention could
become unlawfully indefinite only “where all parties are acting diligently and in good faith” and that “where there is
a reasonable prospect removal will take place with his continued cooperation, the detention will remain compliant
with ss 7 and 9 of the Charter even if its future duration is uncertain”: Toure ONSC, supra note 3 at paras 63 & 65
[emphasis added]. On appeal, in response to the argument that the court below had erroneously justified indefinite
detention on grounds of non-cooperation, the ONCA laconically found that there was no error because the court
below, “noting that his failure to cooperate in the past with the CBSA is a significant factor, also considered all the
other facts of the case. This included a summary of the CBSA efforts to identify Mr. Toure, the failed attempt to
remove him to Guinea, and his reason for continued detention, namely, he was found to be a flight risk”: Toure
ONCA, supra note 2 at para 46. Those other factors had nothing whatsoever to do with the indefinite nature of Mr.
Toure’s prospective detention and the Court of Appeal therefore simply failed to even engage the issue.
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circumvent Canada’s refugee and immigration system.”68 In another more recent judgment,
Chief Justice Crampton of the Federal Court concluded that continued detention is required in
circumstances of non-cooperation. This reasoning was framed by broad statements such as:
“otherwise, such a detainee could simply produce, or contribute to producing, a ‘stalemate,’ for
the purposes of ultimately obtaining his release from detention,” “[t]o hold otherwise would
enable him to manipulate our legal system in order to avoid the execution of a validly issued
removal order,” and “Parliament cannot have intended that the freedom to roam the streets of
Canada, and to go into hiding to avoid removal to one’s country of origin, could be procured in
this manner by persons who pose a danger to the Canadian public or others who do not wish to
cooperate with a validly issued removal order.”69 The Chief Justice’s ultimate conclusion is that,
the scheme of the IRPA and the Regulations … requires resolving a stalemate that
has been produced by the detainee’s failure to fully cooperate with the Minister’s
removal efforts, in favour of continued detention … . Failure to maintain detention in
such circumstances would have the perverse effect of rewarding the detainee for his
failure to cooperate with his removal. 70
Another example is Canada (MPSEP) v Fankem.71 At the time the judgment was
rendered, the individual in question had been detained for more than five years and was being
held in a maximum-security jail. His lack of cooperation was rather unequivocal, as he declined
to even speak to counsel, much less assist the CBSA in any manner in effecting his removal.
However, he was eventually ordered released by the Immigration Division, which found that in
the circumstances, there was no reasonable prospect of removal and that any flight risk posed
could be mitigated by strict conditions of release. The Minister successfully sought judicial
review of this decision, and the release order was quashed. The Court found that the decision was
unreasonable in two respects, both of which were inextricably entwined with the detainee’s
failure to cooperate. First, the Court found that it was unreasonable to release someone who
“would not voluntarily present himself for removal from Canada,” regardless of the conditions
attached to that release order. 72 Second, the Court found that the person concerned was himself
creating an impediment to removal by failing to provide the information necessary to establish
his identity—and this lack of willingness to “comply with court or tribunal orders” necessitated
continuing detention.73 The judgment itself is terse and fits squarely within this recurring theme
whereby non-cooperation is used to justify continued detention. Moreover, this logic would
68

Kamail, supra note 3 at para 38. More recently, see Brown FCA, supra note 4 at para 99.
Lunyamila, supra note 3 at paras 3, 5.
70
Lunyamila, ibid at para 95. See also Philip v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 ABQB 167 at para 34. In Dadzie,
supra note 3, the Ontario SCJ offered a further rationale for finding that non-cooperation justifies continued
detention, analogizing the situation to that of motions for a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under section
11(b) of the Charter in the criminal law context, where delays attributable to the accused cannot be invoked in
favour of the stay of proceedings. However, this analogy is drawn without regard to some important distinctions: the
accused seeking a stay of proceedings is in fact seeking a benefit, namely, to be relieved of criminal liability
regardless of the merits of their case on the basis that the state failed to fulfil the right to be tried within a reasonable
time. It is under section 11(b) that the courts have quite logically found that the accused cannot obtain the benefit of
a stay of proceedings on the basis of their own dilatory conduct. The IRPA detainee is seeking liberty, a fundamental
right under the common law, international human rights law, the Charter, and the IRPA itself (at para 37).
71
Fankem, supra note 14 at paras 7, 9.
72
Ibid at para 8.
73
Ibid at para 9.
69
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appear to justify indefinite detention, given that the Court seems to view detention as justified
until the “stalemate” ends with the detainee capitulating, regardless of how long that may take.
The language adopted in this decision—and over the course of the hearing—speaks
volumes. In the decision, Justice Bell characterized the detainee as someone who “considers
himself as the director of a play and Canadian authorities are but actors subject to his
direction”—an inference that is, at best, difficult to reconcile with him being locked inside a cell
for five years.74 The language from the bench over the course of the hearing was even starker,
describing the detainee as “the puppet master” in reference to the fact that he had been given
access to counsel in the course of his detention, and stating that he was “lucky” to be in a
Canadian jail.75 The antipathy towards the person concerned due to his non-cooperation with the
authorities could not be more patent.
Edging somewhat closer to the middle of the spectrum, there are also judgments within
this first category where non-cooperation serves as a factor that weighs heavily against the other
section 248 IRPR factors that might otherwise justify release, such as the length of detention or
the fact that the detainee has not been found to pose a danger to the public. 76 Under this
approach, absence of cooperation, though not the only consideration, remains the overriding
consideration. In these decisions, the rationale for giving special consideration to noncooperation also remains the concern that migrants should not be permitted to benefit from
uncooperative behaviour or to “circumvent” or “frustrate” the immigration system or the IRPA.
In conclusion, absent from all of these judgments is any reflection on the fact that the
courts are endorsing or even mandating indefinite detention and violating the fundamental rights
of the migrant through the application of non-cooperation as a basis for continued detention. As
another court put it in criticizing this approach, “taken literally, that rationale could justify the
continued detention of a person forever.”77

B. ABESENCE OF COOPERATION CANNOT JUSTIFY INDEFINITE
DETENTION
The second category contains several decisions that generally conclude that indefinite detention
cannot be justified by a lack of cooperation, but stop short of stating that non-cooperation does
not justify lengthy detention. 78 It also includes decisions where, though lack of cooperation is
treated as an important factor to consider, the length of time spent in detention remains a
paramount concern.79 As noted above, it is difficult to reconcile these two categories of cases.
74

Ibid at para 7.
Ibid hearing transcript (Federal Court file IMM-2918-18). Bell J further commented that the person concerned is
“a very competent person who is functioning effectively, as I said before, functioning as a marionette and doing it
very, very effectively”—which, as already noted, is difficult to square with the fact that he remains even at the time
of writing in a maximum security jail after nearly six years of administrative detention.
76
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The logic of the decisions in the first category justifies indefinite detention on the basis of a
detainee’s failure to cooperate. In that first set of decisions, the importance of using detention to
deter non-cooperation is strongly emphasized.80 The decisions in the second category reject any
reasoning that would serve to justify indefinite detention on the basis of lack of cooperation,
recognizing that deterring non-cooperation through detention amounts to unlawfully
transforming what should be non-punitive detention into a mechanism of coercion—thereby
divorcing detention from its immigration purpose.81
However, on closer inspection, the divergence between these cases is perhaps not as great
as it might at first appear. In both, it is at least tacitly accepted that detention on the basis of noncooperation is justified—the divergence lies only in the question of how much or how long
detention can be justified on the basis of non-cooperation.
It is perhaps precisely because this premise is shared across the spectrum of judgments
that there has been virtually no critical engagement of the issue or attempts to develop a
consistent theory of the role of non-cooperation in the detention of non-citizens. While one
judgment raises concerns about the legally problematic application of non-cooperation per se,82
the generalized lack of serious engagement with the concept is resounding. There has been no
robust analysis of the contours of the obligation to cooperate or of its consequences under the
IRPA or in light of the Charter. The potential transformation of immigration detention from nonpunitive administrative detention to a mechanism of coercion wielded against the uncooperative
migrant has been noted and either rejected or affirmed, but in both cases with little analysis. 83
In short, there remains no coherent theory of the role and consequences of noncooperation under Canadian law.

IV. DANGERS OF THE STATUS QUO
instead to focus on the cause for the continuing detention” but not expressly finding that non-cooperation became
irrelevant in the face of a lengthy detention); Panahi 2010, supra note 8 at para 61 (agreeing with Justice Mandamin
in Panahi 2009 that the length of detention has to be considered against “other factors besides his refusal to sign the
letter required by the Iranian authorities,” thus acknowledging its ongoing relevance); Warssama, supra note 1 at
paras 26–34 (noting that Mr. Warssama “may remain incarcerated in Canada for the rest of his life,” noting that the
burden of proof was on the Minister at each and every detention review and that the reviews themselves had not
been robust for some time, and finding that the Division member “was wrong to conclude that the other section 248
factors outweighed the length of his detention”); Shariff v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), 2016 FC 640 at paras 38–42 and 45–46 (finding that two Division decisions ordering release were
reasonable. In the first decision ordering release, the Division concluded that the detention had become so lengthy
“that it outweighed all other factors and, in line with Warssama, had become unreasonable.” In the second decision,
the Division reaffirmed again that “one of the primary issues was how long Mr. Shariff had been in detention and
the length of time it could continue); Chipovalov, supra note 8 at paras 27, 31 (concluding that the Division did “not
err in considering the respondent’s detention to be long-term and that it relied sufficiently on the case law to make
that finding,” observing that the member “noted on several occasions that the length of the detention was due, at
least in part, to the respondent’s refusal to cooperate with the CBSA, and that [the Division member] addressed this
factor in analyzing the subsequent factors in section 248 of the IRPR”).
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See again Lunyamila, supra note 3 at paras 3, 95 and Dadzie, supra note 3 at para 52. See also Toure ONSC,
supra note 4 at para 63, where Court held that the prospect of indefinite detention could only be considered if the
detainee is cooperating “in good faith.”
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82
Ibid at para 26.
83
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In addition to the foundational problem of relying on a concept of lack of cooperation that is
divorced from any clear legal obligation, and the subsequent affront to liberty through the
perpetuation of lengthy or indefinite periods of immigration detention, there are a number of
discrete additional problems and issues that arise with non-cooperation that are cause for concern
and that should be addressed going forward. These issues are reviewed briefly below.

A. THE ABSENCE OF A DEFINITION AND ITS EFECT ON
IMMIGRATION DETENTION
In light of the failure of Canadian courts and tribunals to consider the source and extent of
detainees’ legal obligation to cooperate with their own removal, it is perhaps unsurprising that
there is no common understanding of what conduct actually constitutes absence of cooperation.
This is problematic because it gives tribunals and courts great latitude to find that a very wide
range of behaviour by a detained individual amounts to non-cooperation for the purposes of
continuing their detention. It leaves detainees with no benchmark by which to measure what acts
of agency and autonomy they may consider will have legal implications and what those
implications will be. The following non-exhaustive set of fact patterns in the case law illustrate
just how widely divergent the courts have been in determining whether behaviour constitutes
non-cooperation.
In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Kamail, the respondent could not
be deported to Iran because a travel document from the Iranian government was required, and he
refused to sign the application for that document. 84 There is no discussion of the reason for Mr.
Kamail’s refusal to be deported or of the content of the declaration that he was being asked to
sign. Even if one accepts that unjustified obstructionist conduct may warrant continued
detention, that leaves open the question of whether some reasons for the refusal to cooperate,
such as a stated fear of death upon return (albeit a fear that may have already been assessed by
the Refugee Protection Division and/or the immigration minister in the context of an application
for a pre-removal risk assessment), or some forms of non-cooperation, such as refusal to sign a
statement of voluntary return where return is patently not voluntary, should be assessed
differently. In Warssama v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),85 the detainee
spent more than five years in jail because of his refusal to sign a declaration of voluntary return
to Somalia. Justice Harrington reflects on the perversity of this situation in the opening lines of
his judgment, noting that the respondent had been jailed for five years: “Why? Because he will
not sign a piece of paper!”86
There are other situations where the non-cooperation is not nearly as clearly defined as a
specific refusal to sign a document that would allow deportation to occur. The jurisprudence
shows that courts are inclined to find a wide range of behaviour non-cooperative, including cases
where there was no evidence that a certain course of cooperative action by a detainee would even
lead to their deportation. In Dadzie, for example, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice concluded
that the applicant was uncooperative in that he had not acted in a “productive manner,” that he
“continually and steadfastly failed to assist the authorities in any meaningful way to establish his
identity,” that it could “not regard his actions as meaningful cooperation” and that in some cases
84
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he “actively frustrated their [the CBSA’s] efforts to identify him.” 87 In support of these
statements, the court noted that Mr. Dadzie provided “inconsistent information as to his
antecedents” and that when confronted with these inconsistencies he “admitted numerous times
that he lied.” Mr. Dadzie also refused to provide the state with his fingerprints. 88 Absent from
this decision, however, is any factual finding by the court that certain actions by Mr. Dadzie—
such as consenting to fingerprints or clarifying his antecedents—would have had any meaningful
effect on the CBSA’s ability to deport him. Without such a finding of fact, it simply cannot be
said that Mr. Dadzie’s lack of cooperation was the cause of the CBSA’s inability to deport him—
and therefore the cause of his continuing detention. Under this analysis, any failure to comply
with any demand from the CBSA amounts to “culpable” non-cooperation, regardless of the
presence or absence of a nexus to the prospect of removal.
The slippery slope of findings of non-cooperation is also illustrated by the divergence in
findings between the Immigration Division, the Federal Court, and the provincial superior courts.
Of the decisions reviewed for this article, there were instances where the Immigration Division
had found on multiple occasions that certain behaviour constituted non-cooperation such that it
justified continued detention. The Federal Court or Superior Court then found that same
behaviour either did not constitute non-cooperation in the first place, or that even if it did, it was
not sufficient to justify an order continuing detention.89 In other instances, the Immigration
Division ordered release of an individual multiple times despite demonstrated “noncooperation,”
only to have the Federal Court scrutinize the same set of facts and find that the non-cooperation
at issue justified further detention. 90 For example, Mr. Ali spent over seven years in maximumsecurity facilities in Ontario awaiting deportation. The Minister attempted to characterize his
behaviour as uncooperative and alleged that he was the “sole impediment to his removal.”91 The
Ontario Superior Court of Justice rejected this argument, finding that the fact that Mr. Ali had
“not always been forthright” and that he had on occasion “outright lied about some matters” was
not uncooperative behaviour.92 The court noted that the Attorney General failed to identify any
“concrete” information that was being withheld by Mr. Ali:
Vague references to not knowing the names of Mr. Ali’s teachers; or where he
went to school; or whether he lived for a short period of time in Italy; or the like,
do not go to the central issue regarding his citizenship. For example, while the
Attorney General may be justified in her skepticism about Mr. Ali’s lack of
memory regarding where he lived in New York State in the early 1980’s, even if
Mr. Ali had been able to give the authorities precise addresses where he lived, that
would not assist in determining whether he is a citizen of Ghana or Nigeria or
both. Indeed, I find it somewhat telling, on that point, that the American
authorities have advised that they have no record of Mr. Ali or his mother ever
entering the United States, when it clear that they both did [sic].93
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In front of another court, such as that in Dadzie, Mr. Ali’s “behaviour” may have been found to
constitute non-cooperation sufficient to justify continued detention.
In conclusion, the absence of a clear definition of non-cooperation means that an unspecified
range of behaviour can lead to lengthy or indefinite periods of detention—regardless of whether
lack of cooperation is a considered a relevant factor for purposes of an analysis of the legality of
immigration detention. Without a benchmark against which non-cooperative behaviour can be
measured, immigration detainees are subject to an arbitrary, ill-defined notion of noncooperation and some have been forced to spend years in jail for this reason.

B. USING IMMIGRATION DETENTION AS A TOOL OF DISCIPLINE
AND CONTROL
As Justice Nordheimer pointed out in Ali, detention under the IRPA is administrative and should
remain non-punitive.94 It is unlawful to instrumentalize administrative detention as a mechanism
of coercion.95 However, where lack of cooperation is invoked to justify ongoing detention, and in
particular where it is used to justify indefinite detention, it is difficult to conceive of continued
detention as anything but punishment for non-cooperation, and as a tool of discipline, coercion,
and control of the detainee. Thus, once non-cooperation is accepted as a justification for
detention, there is a demonstrated risk of transforming a power of administrative detention into a
mechanism of discipline. Whatever one may conclude about the utility of such a power, it is
impossible to reconcile it with the most basic of common law and constitutional principles
governing deprivations of liberty by the state in the penal context where discipline, punishment,
and coercion are recognized as legitimate objectives, subject to strict controls such as the right to
silence, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, proportionality, and the prohibition
of indefinite sentences. 96
The non-cooperation case law reflects untested assumptions about the conduct of noncitizens in Canada and how it should be addressed.97 In multiple decisions, the language of the
court clearly shows a concern—and at times a stated belief—that migrants are solely motivated
by a desire to derive as much personal benefit as they can from their “stay” in Canada and that
such ambitions are what drive them to “fail” to cooperate. This language rings clear in the
decisions reviewed above, which are now cited for the proposition that non-cooperation justifies
lengthy or indefinite detention. As noted earlier, none of these decisions consider the broader
contextual factors that might motivate a migrant’s behaviour in interacting with the CBSA, such
as ties to family or community after having built a life in Canada, a fear of mistreatment in the
country of origin upon return (that may or may not have been assessed and found insufficient by
the Refugee Protection Division or the Minister of Immigration), the justifiable frustration that
builds after years of being mistreated while detained in a provincial penitentiary, and failing to
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see any real progress on the part of the CBSA in effecting deportation with the information they
do have at their disposal. 98
It is an impossible task to precisely surmise from the courts’ decisions what exactly forms
the foundation for such conclusions regarding the behaviour of migrants and the assumptions
about their motives and the degree of threat, if any, to the integrity of immigration controls.
However, this phenomenon in the case law can be explained without access to the inner thoughts
of the judiciary insofar as it follows from the general ambiguity around the purpose of
immigration detention, which leads to the conclusion that other state goals are at play here, as
outlined in Part I. If a noncitizen is detained for more than seven years for purposes of
deportation, only to be released back into Canadian society without ever being deported, what
has been achieved? The power of the state to discipline a migrant who has transgressed the
hallowed principle of state sovereignty has been demonstrated, and even if the state was not
ultimately successful in achieving its aim of deportation, the migrant in question has lost years of
their life to this “stalemate.” The migrant may have succeeded in resisting the state, but at what
cost?
The case law leads us back to Foucault’s theory of the disciplinary society as a lens
through which to view immigration detention, particularly when we focus on cases involving
non-cooperation. In Lunyamila, Chief Justice Crampton could not have provided a more implicit
endorsement of discipline and control: despite numerous Division decisions stating that Mr.
Lunyamila should be released as his detention was in contravention of the Charter, the Chief
Justice found that the “tension [between liberty and the imperative of immigration control] must
be resolved in favour of continued detention.”99 The Chief Justice reverts to the same language
as in Kamail, namely that allowing non-cooperation to lead to indefinite detention would “be
effectively to allow that person to frustrate the will of Parliament and, in essence, ‘take the law
into his own hands.’”100 It is on this basis that he finds that the law requires that persons not
98
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cooperating with the government’s removal efforts “must, except in exceptional circumstances,
continue to be detained until such time as they cooperate with their removal.”101 This conclusion
is reached without any consideration of the content of Charter rights, Canada’s international
human rights law obligations, or the requirement to interpret and apply the IRPA in conformity
with those same rights and obligations.102

V. TOWARDS A MORE PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO NONCOOPERATION AND IMMIGRATION DETENTION
We have argued that the detention of migrants on grounds of non-cooperation flows in part from
the desire of the state to discipline the undisciplinable migrant who has dared to transgress the
machinery of border control, thereby subverting state sovereignty and calling into question the
ability of the state to control its own borders. Having posited this as a partial explanation for the
phenomenon as observed, we do not intend to suggest that the problem itself is intractable—even
in the current political and social environment where there appears to be near-universal
acceptance that non-cooperation is at least a factor to consider in the context of assessing the
legality of immigration detention. In fact, assuming for the sake of argument that noncooperation will continue to factor into the analysis, there remain a number of measures that can
and must be taken to at least temper the injustice and lack of coherence described above.

A. DEFINE NON-COOPERATION
One of the most obvious problems in the Canadian jurisprudence is the lack of definition of noncooperation: what one judge or Division adjudicator considers sufficient cooperation may be
non-cooperation to another. This situation creates a huge measure of uncertainty for detainees
and provides undue latitude to the Minister to argue that a wide array of conduct amounts to
culpable non-cooperation. In adjudicating the legality of ongoing detention, judges and
administrative adjudicators are left with significant discretion to find that the detainee is not
sufficiently cooperating such that continued detention is justified.
Even if one accepts that absence of cooperation is relevant for an assessment of the
legality of detention, it must be precisely and clearly defined in light of its implications for the
detainee’s liberty. While it may be the case that migrants cannot be given a free hand to thwart
the machinery of border control, there remain limits on the intrusions on liberty that can be
justified on that basis.
At most, relevant uncooperative conduct must be limited to actions that demonstrably
impede removal and for which there is no sufficient explanation. The burden must rest clearly on
the Minister to establish that the detainee’s conduct is an actual impediment to removal—and not
just an impediment to whatever step the CBSA wishes to take at a given time—and all
compelling reasons for non-cooperation must be considered.103 Detainees’ rights to privacy and
personal integrity cannot be discarded on a whim, and the refusal to provide DNA samples or
101
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consent to the public circulation of their photograph cannot be regarded as breaching any duty of
reasonable cooperation.

B. INDEFINITE DETENTION IS UNLAWFUL
The second step would be to clearly stipulate in legislation or in jurisprudence that indefinite
detention is unlawful, regardless of whether or not the detainee is cooperating. The past or
prospective time in detention that may be attributable to non-cooperative behaviour cannot
override the fact that a detention has become indefinite and thus unlawful. This approach
requires recognition of the fact that, regardless of the principle of sovereignty, borders are
porous, and the fact that a migrant has succeeded in entering the nation state without first seeking
permission to do so does not absolve Canadian courts and tribunals from the obligation to justify
coercion in the form of imprisonment. One legal principle that is clear in the case law is that
immigration detention must remained hinged to an immigration purpose in order to be lawful—
regardless of a migrant’s failure to cooperate with border authorities—and where it is no longer
clear that a detainee is deportable, detention becomes indefinite, and should therefore be
considered unlawful.

C. SET LIMITS ON THE LENGTH OF DETENTION
The obvious limitation of the foregoing principle—recognizing that at some point detention
becomes unlawful because it is indefinite even if the detainee is uncooperative—is that it leaves
the harder questions unanswered: how long is too long, and at what point does detention become
unlawful?
At least some Canadian courts have found that indefinite detention is per se unlawful,
and recognized that there comes a time that, non-cooperation notwithstanding, detention can no
longer be justified. 104 However, they have (at times expressly) declined to articulate when that
line is crossed, or even how the assessment is to be conducted. A similar situation prevails in the
United Kingdom (UK). It has long been the law in the UK that those detained for removal cannot
be held for unreasonable periods of time, and detention cannot be maintained if there is no
reasonable prospect of removal. 105 The UK Supreme Court has also recognized that “the fact that
the detained person has refused voluntary return should not be regarded as a ‘trump card’ which
enables the Secretary of State to continue to detain until deportation can be effected, whenever
that may be.”106
However, like the Canadian case law, that statement fails to articulate a means for
determining how long is too long. 107 As illustrated by the judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) in JN v United Kingdom, the question of where that line is drawn
104
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remains elusive. In JN, the ECtHR held that Article 5 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR)—which protects the right to liberty—requires that the duration of detention be
limited in nature and not indefinite. 108 The ECtHR also found that it was arbitrary to detain the
applicant for fifteen additional months after it had already become clear that he was not going to
cooperate with his own removal (which would have occurred no more than six months into his
detention).109 In so finding, the ECtHR, however, also held that UK law was not inconsistent
with the ECHR by reason of the fact that it does not establish a legislative maximum duration of
detention for removal.110 In other words, the ECtHR left open the question of exactly how long is
too long, meaning that UK courts must continue to grapple with that rather intractable question.
Fixed upper limits on the length of detention are necessary to resolve the otherwise
intractable question of how long is too long. International human rights bodies have repeatedly
found that migrants cannot be detained indefinitely, and that this protection applies regardless of
the detainee’s cooperation or lack thereof. 111 These same bodies have also repeatedly found that
states must legislate upper limits on the duration of immigration detention in order to adequately
protect against indefinite detention. 112 This is precisely the legislative choice made in the
108
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European Union where detention for the purpose of removal, with some exceptions, is governed
by the Returns Directive.113 Article 15 provides that the maximum period of detention for the
purpose of removal is six months, which may be extended for an additional maximum of twelve
months under two specific circumstances: where the delay is caused either by the detainee’s noncooperation or by a third country. 114 There is no provision for detention for the purposes of
removal beyond eighteen months, and, in all cases, release is mandatory where there is no
reasonable prospect of removal, regardless of whether the six-month or eighteen-month
thresholds have been met. 115
While Canadian courts have, to date, been resistant to arguments promoting the necessity
of a legislated or court-imposed maximum duration of detention,116 we argue that such limits are
necessary to protect against indefinite detention and to protect against transforming
administrative detention under the IRPA into a measure of punishment and coercion. Leaving the
assessment to adjudicators to be decided on a case-by-case basis is unsatisfactory. There is no
principled way to assess the point at which detention has become too long. As the Supreme
Court has determined in the context of acceptable time-limits for pre-trial delay, numerical
thresholds promote clarity and consistency. 117

VI. CONCLUSION
A finding of non-cooperation in the immigration detention context has lasting and serious
consequences for the detainee. Migrants are detained for lengthy and indefinite periods of time
on the basis of allegations of non-cooperation. Despite the severity of the consequence, the
concept is undefined in the case law and there have been no serious attempts to even connect
culpable non-cooperation to the breach of a legal duty. The failure on the part of courts to
articulate a clear legal principle underlying detention for non-cooperation must be taken as
indicative of deeper tensions underlying the case law—and the purpose of immigration detention
more generally. Non-cooperation reveals one of the fundamental contradictions at the heart of
immigration detention: the ambiguity over the purpose it serves. Detention continues to be
formally understood as preventative, not punitive, and aimed solely at furthering the machinery
of border control—and yet the ways in which it is being wielded, particularly in the context of
non-cooperation, reveal that these purposes do not explain the practice. What emerges from our
analysis is that immigration detention is being used as a disciplinary tool to coerce capitulation
by vulnerable non-citizens to the will of the state. It would also appear that detention for noncooperation serves as a means for the Canadian state to display its effectiveness in the realm of
immigration control in the face of societal fears relating to the apparent porousness of borders.
Simultaneously, the case law reveals the agency migrants retain to push back against the power
of the state by refusing to capitulate to state control—and the great cost at which the exercise of
such agency comes in the face of the disciplinary society. Despite these tensions, some
elementary safeguards could at least temper the injustices wrought by the present state of the
law, and their adoption in other jurisdictions suggests their practicability in the Canadian context.
113
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